Simulated Cyber Attack

The critical role of lawyers and governance in keeping a bad day from becoming a tragic year

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
Cyber-Attack Scenario

December 23-28, 2024




- You're in-house at a public company. At noon on the Friday before the Christmas holidays you get a
 FaceTime call from your CEO: "One of our primary service providers has been hit with ransomware, and
 they have critical documents that cannot be released."
- The connection seems poor. The CEO says she is on a plane about to depart for Rome, but she directs you to "pay the attackers whatever they want now!" She then abruptly disconnects, before you have time to ask any questions.
- Moments later, you get an email saying: "we got your service provider, but we have your data. If you
 don't want it publicly released before the holiday, click <u>here</u>; if you need more time, click <u>here</u>."
- You try to contact the CISO on his office line, but no one answers. Time goes by, and you try again, with no luck.
- A follow-up text to your cell reads: "This is your last chance, click to pay or click here for more time."
- You click for more time, download a .pdf of more information, and are relieved when a subsequent message thanks you for your responsiveness and indicates you now have 14 days before any impacts to your company's data.
- You decide not to bother people before the holidays.

Group discussion




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Key Considerations




- It's now Christmas day and you are awoken by multiple messages that systems are starting to lock up. You sign on and realize your system as well is showing a ransom message...
- Follow-up messages, apparently from the same attackers, now include a link to a schedule of internal documents, including employee data. The pre-selected data is set to "automatic leaks," and a timer counts down ominously unless 100 Bitcoin (~6.2m USD) is payed by Monday.
- The CFO convenes a core team remotely and says: "I know it's Christmas, but we have a real problem on our hands." You can hear him rapidly clicking in the background. "I am trying to find out what they have, but it's a lot and it's downloading slowly. I do know we can't let some of this become public. Our confidential merger documents are here!"
- Another executive jumps in: "Look, we need to pay and pay now! This is serious. It's not just the data they
 have, but we may not be able to service our customers!"
- Your mind is flooded. A wave of realization comes crashing down on you. You go to raise the possibility that
 you may have been tricked into clicking on a fraudulent link, but you decide there will be time for that later.
- The CFO says, "OK, I will try the CEO. If I can't reach her in the next 5 minutes, I will authorize the payment."
- He then adds: "Oh, I see they have also have a ton of data belonging to our overseas employees."

RECOVER-FILES.bit - Notepad File Edit Format View Help >> what happened? Important files on your network was ENCRYPTED and now they have " In order to recover your files you need to follow instructions below. - 0 × Sensitive data on your network was DOWNLOADED. If you DON'T WANT your sensitive data to be PUBLISHED you have to act quickly. " extension. Data includes: - Employees personal data, CVS, DL, SSN. - Complete network map including credentials for local and remote services. - Private financial information including: clients data, bills, budgets, annual reports, bank statements. - Manufacturing documents including: datagrams, schemas, drawings in solidworks format Samples are available on your personal web page linked below. >> CAUTION DO NOT MODIFY ENCRYPTED FILES YOURSELF. DO NOT USE THIRD PARTY SOFTWARE TO RESTORE YOUR DATA. DO NOT USE THIRD PARTY SOFTWARE TO RESTORE YOUR DATA. YOU MAY DAMAGE YOUR FILES, IT WILL RESULT IN PERMANENT DATA LOSS. >> What should I do next? 1) Download and install Tor Browser from: https://torproject.org/ 2) Navigate to: http://75gw6lqfesrhbitz2r4yihnrm4sknz3q2m5kf6ulpidt2wxuxs7zbaid.onion/?access-key= 2) State to: http://75gw6lqfesrhbitz2r4yihnrm4sknz3q2m5kf6ulpidt2wxuxs7zbaid.onion/?access-key= 2) State to: http://restate.com 2) State to: http:// %2FBgRmq2LVNtw9880cB5UQ980JOQCuoNTrzoYUŽJC6wWwNkM4BXphV4rSGcOroIJbFAs%2B42qYKF8dskmJu2U1XFvjyUluTItfdH %2BeuwEhesrwR686MaCfyAPyfw4whVVtKdPedI2k4HYAmbwFwN3Br260XMLx0EQy56N34LJM2QLcOJE8D1%2FJ3jWu1lJanMyQ4TRPXvKSyrHdNrqf4dVh0Vrscy %2BsTZdTpfGnJwaUwoCCMpnU%2FEDpvOrPlg5ZwQ%3D%3D



Key Considerations



Let the experts handle the investigation! Downloading data, negotiating yourself, or making decisions without expertise can make the incident worse!

Scenario



- The CEO is now firmly in control of the situation. She directs that no ransom be paid "until we get to the bottom of this."
- The CISO retains their cyber forensic company, Cypfer, who dials in from California. You record the call so nothing
 missed and engage an AI-powered transcription and summary function. Cypfer is working before and during the call to
 scope the problem as per their retainer. They outline what they know about the attackers: "low-medium confidence they
 are state-backed."
- The CIO states: "We have the best in the business, and Cypfer has drawn its people from NSA and GCHQ, can't we go in and stop them ourselves?!"
- They also reveal more details about the documents, having downloaded them on a stand-alone "clean machine." Some include complete personnel files for current and former California-based, UK, German and Japanese employees, while others include highly confidential strategic documents. Some files are encrypted.
- The room is abuzz with activity, as Comms quietly works in a corner typing out a press release, which includes an apology and assurances of a quick return to business as usual. Comms is also having to respond to reporter requests for comments based on a employee's Facebook post about a "Cyber snowday! No work today!"
- Just then you overhear from the corner of the room: "May not be covered?! What do you mean?!" They must be talking about your cyber insurance.
- "One more thing," Cypfer reluctantly adds, "within the exfiltrated files there are rather disturbing emails and documents from the CEO..."
- "What?!" the CEO interjects. "This is... what?! I never did this! These are completely made up!"

Group discussion



<u>Poll</u>: There are a lot of communications to consider. Choose which list represents the top three groups of people you need to communicate with first:

- 1) Board, largest enterprise customers (under contractual terms & before they hear it in the news), and EU regulators (per the GDPR)
- 2) Insurance Broker/Insurer, Public Statement (before news and rumors start), US regulators (SEC, state regulators, industry regulators)
- 3) Board, EU regulators, Law Enforcement
- 4) Insurance Broker/Insurer, Board, Largest enterprise customers
- 5) Insurance, Board, Public Statement

Key considerations



- If the attackers are state-backed, should that change how you respond? Does it create any legal obligations? Could it affect your cyber insurance coverage?
- Need to maximize legal privilege (three-way agreements signed in advance).
- Consider how different types of "sensitive" data, including personal data, must be treated. What type of data is most valuable? Security information?
- Consistent and Coordinated Communications to Media, Boards, and Regulators, and to do it all globally, especially challenging with varying triggers (eg risk of harm).
- Dangers of "hacking back."
- Recording calls with individuals in California (and other jurisdictions) without consent can lead to liability; could "waive" work product privilege; ensure that you are complying with foreign law when handling multinational incidents.
- Data manipulation attacks
- How to deal with system impacts
- Need to review social media policies
- What's the succession plan if key leaders can't participate?
- Even encrypted data may soon be reportable (eg in Japan), especially in light of steal-now-decrypt-later attacks

Key takeaways

Key takeaways



- Hope is not a Plan. Instead, plan for the worst, hope for the best.
- Governance and lawyers make the difference between a bad day and a tragic year
- The global threat and regulatory environments are rapidly changing—and so must we
- Information Security isn't just about technology
- High tech problems can have low tech solutions
- Look out for single points of failure including conflicts of interest, poor escalations paths, knee jerk reactions
- When a breach occurs, avoid "kid soccer"
- If you have to ask the question whether to notify, it is usually better to notify (or, "when in doubt, get it out")
- You don't have to outrun the bear, only the slowest camper (in other words, it's about being reasonable and creating a favorable record of reasonableness)
- The plans may be useless, but the planning is essential